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Abstract
Previous work has shown that people often underestimate their task-completion times
(Buehler, Grin, & Ross, 1994). The present research examined whether this optimistic
bias may be reduced through the formation of implementation intentions. In an
experimental study, participants were requested to complete an assignment within a
specified time period. Half of these participants made implementation intentions about
where and when they would complete the assignment. The remaining participants were
simply given the goal of completing the assignment. The results showed that furnishing
participants’ goals with implementation intentions led to (a) more optimistic completion
predictions, (b) an even greater increase in actual rates of goal completion, and,
consequently, (c) a significant reduction in optimistic bias in completion predictions.
Furthermore, the reduction in optimistic bias among implementation–intention
participants was found to be mediated by a smaller number of interruptions while
working on the assignment. Together, these findings attest to the importance of
implementation planning in overcoming unrealistic optimism in task-completion
predictions. Copyright # 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
People often believe that they will accomplish their goals more quickly than they
actually do (Armor & Taylor, 1998; Buehler, Grin, & Ross, 1994, 1995). This
tendency, also known as the planning fallacy (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), appears
to be pervasive at every level of human activity. The history of grand construction
projects, for example, is laden with costly failures to meet important deadlines (Hall,
1980). Closer to home, a recent classroom survey showed that students typically finish
more than two thirds of their projects later than expected (Buehler et al., 1994).
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Although overly optimistic planning can be beneficial (Armor & Taylor, 1998), it may
have detrimental consequences as well. For instance, Baumeister, Heatherton, and
Tice (1993) found that inflated performance predictions are associated with making
excessive commitments, which may eventually undermine actual performance. In
light of these considerations, it seems important to identify circumstances that can
promote more realistic planning.
WHY FORECASTERS NEGLECT THEIR PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE:
THE CASE FOR SCENARIO THINKING
People make time predictions for a host of everyday tasks (Buehler et al., 1995).
Moreover, the criteria for evaluating the accuracy of one’s time predictions are
relatively unambiguous. Thus, people seem to have ample opportunity to learn that
their completion predictions suer from an optimistic bias. Why then, do people
continue to make the planning fallacy?
At least part of the answer may lie in the cognitive processes by which people
generate their predictions. According to Buehler et al. (1994, 1995), people typically
arrive at their completion predictions by constructing a mental scenario that sketches
out how a given project is likely to develop (cf. Grin, Dunning, and Ross, 1990;
Johnson & Sherman, 1990; Kahneman & Lovallo, 1991). Because people are
incapable of taking every possible event into account, these mental scenarios neglect
many alternative ways in which the future might unfold. Nevertheless, people will
usually rely heavily on their mental scenarios, partly because simply imagining an
event increases the perceived likelihood that an event will actually occur (Carroll,
1978; Sherman, Skov, Hervitz, & Stock, 1981; see further Koehler, 1991).
Accordingly, the process of scenario thinking may set people up for a rather ironic
cycle of events. By holding on to their favorite versions of the future, people may be
‘doomed to repeat’ the past while knowing it (Buehler et al., 1994, p. 366).
The presumed role of scenario thinking was recently subjected to empirical testing
by Buehler et al. (1994). In this research, think-aloud procedures recorded
participants’ on-line narratives as they estimated their completion times for various
academic tasks. Consistent with the foregoing analysis, participants’ narratives were
overwhelmingly directed towards their future plans for the current project. At the
same time, these narratives were barely concerned with potential impediments or
participants’ previous experience with similar projects. Thus, these findings confirm
the notion that the planning fallacy may arise because people rely on faulty reasoning
(i.e. scenario thinking) while they are generating predictions.
WHEN FORECASTERS ENGAGE IN WISHFUL THINKING:
THE CASE FOR MOTIVATED REASONING
Research has shown that motivational factors often moderate the types of reasoning
that people employ, a phenomenon known as motivated reasoning (e.g. De Dreu,
Koole, & Oldersma, 1999; for reviews, see Kruglanski &Webster, 1996; Kunda, 1990;
Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). It seems plausible that the notion of motivated
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reasoning also extends to the task of generating completion predictions. Accordingly,
people’s wishes and desires may aect their tendency to engage in scenario thinking,
thereby producing a change in their level of optimistic bias.
A recent experiment by Buehler, Grin, and MacDonald (1997) investigated the
role of motivated reasoning in making completion predictions. The results showed
that participants who had received a speed incentive displayed greater optimistic bias
in their completion predictions relative to participants without such an incentive.
Supplemental thought-listing protocols revealed that speed incentives caused
participants to focus more narrowly on their plans for the upcoming task at the
expense of the consideration of past experience. Interestingly, participants who were
provided with an accuracy incentive displayed a marginally significant tendency to
overestimate their actual completion times, suggesting that these participants tended
to err in a pessimistic direction. Taken together, these findings indicate that motivated
reasoning can exert a powerful influence on the degree of optimistic bias, in particular
by aecting people’s propensity to engage in scenario thinking.
Taken at face value, Buehler et al.’s (1997) findings would seem to oer a
convenient way towards eliminating the planning fallacy. By substituting speed
incentives for incentives to make accurate predictions, it may be possible to do away
with optimistic bias for good. Unfortunately, this strategy may be accompanied by
considerable motivational costs. As it turns out, optimistic expectancies can promote
actual task performance, even when those expectancies turn out to be unrealistic
(Buehler, MacDonald, & Grin 1994, cited in Buehler et al., 1995). Tempering
people’s optimism may therefore frequently be ill-advised, because doing so may
undermine people’s subsequent motivation and performance. Thus, it would appear
that a certain amount of optimistic bias in completion predictions is often inevitable.
FROM GOAL SETTING TO GOAL STRIVING:
THE VOLITIONAL BENEFITS OF PLANNING
Or is it? Suppose if people could increase the eectiveness of their goal pursuits to
such a degree that even their highly optimistic goals could be met. If that were
possible, people could retain their optimistic outlooks without making excessive
commitments. Although this may sound too good to be true, there may actually exist
a mental strategy that is capable of suciently boosting the eectiveness of people’s
goal pursuits.
To understand how this can occur, we need to consider in more detail how the
process of planning mentally prepares the individual for future action (Gollwitzer,
1990, 1993, 1996, 1999; Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998). Drawing from notions in classic
German will psychology (Ach, 1910), Heckhausen (1991) and Gollwitzer (1993)
proposed that planning consists of two successive stages, goal setting and goal
striving. The specific tasks addressed in each stage are further assumed to activate
dierent cognitive procedures or ‘mindsets’ (Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, & Steller, 1990;
Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987). During the stage of goal setting, the individual
presumably acquires a deliberative mindset, i.e. an orientation towards an accurate
analysis of feasibility-related information. During the subsequent stage of goal
striving, the individual presumably acquires an implemental mindset, i.e. an
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orientation towards a self-serving, optimistic analysis of information. Relevant
research has produced support for the hypothesized qualitative dierences between
deliberative and implemental mindsets (Beckmann & Gollwitzer, 1987; Gollwitzer &
Kinney, 1989; Gollwitzer et al., 1990; Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987; Taylor &
Gollwitzer, 1995). Most relevant here, recent research by Armor and Taylor
(discussed in Armor & Taylor, 1998, unpublished manuscript) has shown that
optimistic bias in completion predictions becomes increased when people have an
implemental mindset, and decreased when they have a deliberative mindset.
Although the above-mentioned research suggests that contemplating the imple-
mentation of one’s goals mainly serves to increase the planning fallacy, it should be
kept in mind that this research mainly addressed the eects of cognitive mindset.
Implemental mindsets are ultimately geared towards facilitating action implementa-
tion, but they are primarily directed towards people’s cognitive functioning
(Gollwitzer, 1996). To maximize the action-facilitating eects of planning, additional
volitional strategies may be required (Gollwitzer, 1999). Specifically, people may
furnish their goal intentions, or commitments to particular goals, with implementation
intentions, concrete action plans that specify when, where, and how, to act.
Laboratory experiments have shown that implementation intentions cause the mental
representation of the anticipated situation to become highly activated and thus easily
accessible (Aarts, Dijksterhuis, & Midden, 1999; Steller, 1992, discussed in
Gollwitzer, 1999). Furthermore, the formation of implementation intentions serves
to automatize action initiation (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Gollwitzer &
Brandsta¨tter, 1997; Malzacher, 1992, discussed in Gollwitzer, 1999).
Implementation intentions can also be useful after action initiation has taken place,
by helping people to ward o distractions stemming from alternative goal pursuits
(Patterson & Mischel, 1976; Schaal & Gollwitzer, 1999, discussed in Gollwitzer,
1999).
Research has further shown that implementation intentions can exert strong eects
on behavior outside of the laboratory. In one study, Gollwitzer and Brandsta¨tter
(1997) found that the formation of implementation intentions helped participants to
complete an assignment during their Christmas break within a fixed deadline. Similar
findings have been obtained in other research, indicating that implementation
intentions are helpful in promoting a variety of health-promotion and disease-
prevention behaviors, such as performing breast self-examinations (Orbell, Hodgkins,
& Sheeran, 1997), regular intake of a vitamin supplement (Sheeran & Orbell, 1999),
and eating healthy foods (Verplanken & Faes, 1999). Taken together, these findings
suggest that implementation intentions constitute a powerful self-regulatory tool that
serves to bring people’s actions in line with their goals (Gollwitzer, 1999). As such, it
seems conceivable that the formation of implementation intentions can help to reduce
the planning fallacy.
THE PRESENT RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES
The foregoing discussed two powerful lines of research that are especially relevant to
the understanding of optimistic planning. The first has focused on cognitive and
motivational determinants of optimism in specific task-completion predictions
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(Buehler et al., 1994, 1997). The second line of research has predominantly focused on
volitional determinants of global optimism and goal-completion rates (Gollwitzer &
Brandsta¨tter, 1997; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995). Importantly, these two lines of
research have recently been synthesized in a set of studies showing how deliberative
versus implemental mindsets aect task-specific optimism and completion rates (see
Armor & Taylor, 1997). In the present research, we sought to expand on this new
synthesis by examining the utility of implementation intentions in reducing unrealistic
optimism in specific task-completion predictions.1 This extension is theoretically
important because the volitional benefits of planning should be at a maximum when
the individual has engaged in implementation planning that is directly relevant to the
task at hand. Thus, previous research may have underestimated the potential of
implementation planning in combatting optimistic bias in task-completion predic-
tions.
To address these issues, we adapted the report assignment paradigm developed by
Gollwitzer and Brandsta¨tter (1997). Following this paradigm, we gave our
participants the assignment to write a report concerning a particular day in the
near future. As in Gollwitzer and Brandsta¨tter (1997), one half of the participants
were requested to form implementation intentions regarding where and when to write
the report. The remaining participants were simply requested to write the report.
Immediately following this manipulation, participants were asked to predict their
rates of completing the assignment. Participants then recorded their actual initiation
and completion rates for working on the assignment.
In light of previous findings that contemplating the implementation of one’s goals
fosters an optimistic mindset (Armor & Taylor, 1997; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995), we
predicted that implementation–intention participants would be more optimistic in
their completion predictions than control participants. In addition, we predicted that
forming an implementation intention would result in an actual increase of
participants’ rates of goal completion. Third, and most important, we hypothesized
that the eects of implementation intentions would be greater for actual than for
predicted behavior. This hypothesis was based on previous findings that behavioral
eects of implementation intentions are particularly strong (cf. Gollwitzer, 1999).
Accordingly, implementation–intention participants were expected to display less
optimistic bias in their forecasting than control participants.
Besides the above-mentioned hypotheses, the present research also addressed some
of the behavioral mechanisms that may mediate the influence of implementation
planning. First, previous work by Gollwitzer and Brandsta¨tter (1997) indicates that
implementation intentions may be especially helpful in the service of initiating goal-
directed behavior. To assess whether the formation of implementation intentions had
a dierential impact on task initiation and task completion, we obtained separate
assessments of predicted and actual rates of task initiation and task completion.
Second, we explored the potential shielding function of implementation planning.
According to Buehler et al. (1995), goal interruptions constitute an important source
1 It is important to note that our predictions were only concerned with directional (optimistic) bias in
prediction. Correspondence between predictions and actual completion times can also be assessed at the
correlational level. This correlational form of predictive accuracy needs to be distinguished from directional
bias both theoretically and empirically (Buehler et al., 1994; see also Funder & Colvin, 1997). However, in
keeping with previous research on the planning fallacy (Armor & Taylor, 1997; Buehler et al., 1994, 1997),
we were primarily interested in the determinants of directional bias.
Overcoming the planning fallacy 877
Copyright # 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 30, 873–888 (2000)
of optimistic bias in completion predictions, because people generally fail to
incorporate such distractions into their plan-based scenarios. As Gollwitzer (1999)
have shown, forming implementation intentions can be especially helpful in warding
o distractions stemming from alternative goal pursuits. Thus, implementation
intentions may help to reduce optimistic bias in completion predictions by reducing
the number of interruptions during the execution of the goal. To explore this
possibility, we assessed the number of interruptions during task completion (i.e.
writing the report), and investigated whether reductions in optimistic bias due to
forming implementation intentions were mediated by corresponding reductions in the
number of interruptions.
METHOD
Participants and Design
One hundred and twenty undergraduate students (28 men and 92 women, average age
22 years) from the University of Nijmegen were randomly assigned to one of two
experimental conditions (goal intention or implementation intention). As soon as
participants’ reports were returned to the laboratory, participants were paid Dfl. 7,50
(approximately US$4) for their participation.
Overall, 80 participants (i.e. 67% of the original sample) returned their report
within the assigned period. The return rate was virtually equal between the two
experimental conditions (39 versus 41). Empirically, this null finding corroborates
Gollwitzer and Brandsta¨tter (1997, Experiment 2), who similarly failed to find an
eect on return rates (in fact, return rates in their experiment were slightly higher in
the goal-intention condition than in the implementation–intention condition).
Although the absence of an eect of implementation planning on return rates may
seem at odds with the current hypotheses, this finding actually agrees with the line of
thinking that inspired the present research. Theoretically, return rates represent a
motivational variable, given that they involve the issue ‘Shall I engage in this task or
not?’. Thus, given that implementation planning represents a volitional manipulation,
its lack of eects on return rates is not surprising. Instead, eects of implementation
planning should only emerge on goal-completion rates, which represent a volitional
variable because they involve the how and when of goal pursuits. As such, the lack of
eects on return rates, in conjunction with the findings for goal-completion rates (see
the Results section), support the usefulness of discriminating between motivational
and volitional variables.
Procedure
During a two-week period, participants were recruited at the psychology department
in Nijmegen. Upon their arrival in the laboratory, participants were seated in
individual cubicles, where they received a written instruction. The first part of the
instruction was identical for both conditions. It was explained that the study was
concerned with how students spend their leisure time. Participants were told that they
were to write a lively report of their experiences during a specific day of their lives.
This day was to be chosen by participants themselves, but had to fall within an
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assigned period of one week. This was always one week after the instruction was
given. It was explained that memories of experiences during leisure time fade rather
quickly so that it was important to write the report as quickly as possible after the day
of the report. Preferably, the report was to be written within one day after the report
day had passed. The report itself was to be returned within two weeks after the
assigned week had passed. Instructions further stressed that participants would
remain anonymous. Anonymity was secured by a specific coding scheme that required
participants to create their own code number from three letters and a digit (i.e. first
letter of mother’s first name, of her maiden name, and of their own place of birth).
After the assignment was explained to them, participants were asked to predict on
which day they would start writing the report and on which they thought they would
be finished writing it. Participants were told to write their predictions on the
instruction sheet. At this point, instructions started to dier between conditions.
Following the procedure outlined by Gollwitzer and Brandsta¨tter (1997), participants
in the implementation–intention condition were asked to make the same predictions,
but were also asked to specify when and where they intended to write their report.
They picked a specific point in time (e.g. right after breakfast the next morning) and a
certain place (e.g. in a quiet corner in the living room) for starting to write. Moreover,
they were asked to visualize the chosen situation and to commit themselves to seize it
by silently saying ‘I intend to write the report in situation x’. In addition, participants
were requested to record their choices of time and place on the instruction sheet.
Goal-intention participants did not go through this part of the procedure.
After participants handed the instruction sheets to the experimenter, they were
supplied with a prepared form on which they were to write the report. Participants
were requested to write down their personal code and to record every occasion and the
times (date, hour, and minute; from beginning to end) when they had been working
on the report. They also received a stamped envelope carrying the address of the
social psychology department. In a short oral instruction, the experimenter repeated
that participants should write as valid a report as possible using no more than two
pages (the form consisted of two pages only). All participants were asked to send the
finished reports back as soon as possible.
Finally, participants were asked to put their personal codes and bank account
numbers on a separate form. It was explained that we would need this information in
order to deposit their participation fees to their bank accounts after we had received
their completed assignments. This form was kept separately from the instruction
sheets and it was stressed that all the data were confidential and that there was no way
to identify the participants. Two weeks after the last assigned period had passed, the
promised fees were transferred to the participants who had returned their reports.2
2Due to an administrative error, the postmarks on participants’ return envelopes were not stamped.
Consequently, it was not possible to check the dates of returning the assignment on the postmarks.
Fortunately, the results by Gollwitzer and Brandsta¨tter (1997) have shown that in the present paradigm,
there exists very high convergence between objective completion times and those reported by the
participants themselves.
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RESULTS
Treatment of the Data
On average, participants reported spending 45 uninterrupted minutes writing the
report. These self-reported uninterrupted writing times did not dier between
conditions, F5 1.5. This nonsignificant result is meaningful, because it reduces the
suspicion that participants in the implementation–intention condition were simply
less thorough in their fulfillment of the experimental assignment than participants in
the goal-intention condition.
Task-initiation times were computed relative to the chosen report days. Thus, an
initiation time of 1 indicates that a participant reported that he or she began working
on the report one day after the chosen report day had gone by. Similarly, the days on
which participants finished the report (to be called: completion times) were corrected
for the initiation date by subtracting the initiation dates from the completion dates.
Thus, a task-completion time of 1 indicates that a participant reported having finished
the report one day after he or she started working on it.
Actual and Predicted Task-completion Times
Predicted and actual rates of goal completion were subjected to a 2 (condition:
implementation intention or goal intention) 2 (action phase: initiation or
completion) 2 (type of measure: prediction or behavior) mixed-model ANOVA,
with repeated measures on the second and third factors. This analysis revealed a
significant eect of action phase, F(1,78)  4.06, p5 0.05, which indicated that
predicted and actual initiation times were longer than predicted and actual
completion times (M  1.03 versus M  0.57). Because the action phase factor did
not interact with the other factors, it was dropped from the analyses reported here.
We refer to initiation and completion times together as ‘rates of goal completion’.
Relevant means are displayed in Table 1.
The analysis further showed a main eect of type of measure, F(1,78)  8.17,
p5 0.006, indicating that, on average, predicted rates of goal completion were faster
than actual rates of goal completion (M  1.25 versus M  1.94). In addition, a
main eect was found for condition, F(1,78)  11.14, p5 0.002. Separate analyses
revealed that participants in the implementation intention predicted faster rates of
goal completion than participants in the goal-intention condition, F(1,78)  5.32,
p5 0.03 (M  0.85 versus M  1.67). In addition, actual rates of goal completion
were significantly faster in the implementation intention than in the goal-intention
condition, F(1,78)  10.97, p5 0.002 (M  1.02 versus M  2.90).
Importantly, the expected interaction between condition and type of measure was
obtained, F(1,78)  4.67, p5 0.04. Further analyses showed that unrealistic
Table 1. Predicted and actual rates of goal completion (in days) as a function of condition
Condition Predicted Actual Unrealistic optimism
Implementation intention 0.85 1.02 0.17
Goal intention 1.67 2.90 1.23
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optimism, indexed by the dierence between predicted and actual rates of goal
completion, was smaller in the implementation–intention condition than in the goal-
intention condition, (M  0.17 versus M  1.23). In the implementation–intention
condition, unrealistic optimism was not reliably dierent from zero, F(1,40)  2.68,
p  0.109. In the goal-intention condition, participants were clearly unrealistically
optimistic about their rates of goal completion, F(1,38)  6.29, p5 0.02. In short, the
formation of implementation intentions led to an important reduction in unrealistic
optimism regarding the rates of goal completion.
Absolute Accuracy
Although our main interest was in investigating directional optimistic bias,
correspondence between predicted and actual completion times can also be assessed
at the correlational level. This correlational index is sometimes referred to as the
‘absolute accuracy’ of predictions (Buehler et al., 1994). Overall absolute accuracy
was high and statistically reliable, r  0.55, p5 0.001. This correlation is comparable
to that found in similar research (e.g. Buehler et al., 1994). Furthermore, this
correlation was not found to vary between the experimental conditions. This finding
is consistent with other research showing that directional bias and absolute accuracy
are both empirically and theoretically distinct (Buehler et al., 1994, 1995; see also
Funder & Colvin, 1997). One explanation for the lack of eects on absolute accuracy
may be that implementation planning exerts to a large degree parallel eects on
predictions and behavior, so that it may leave the relation between predictions and
behavior essentially intact. Another explanation may be that, even in the control
condition, the correlation between predictions and behavior was fairly high. Indeed, a
recent review (Armor & Taylor, 1998) showed that, despite the existence of a
pervasive optimistic bias, people’s specific predictions are not indiscriminantly
optimistic: they tend to obey the constraints of reality. Given people’s apparent
sensitivity to the demands of the situation at the correlational level, it may have been
dicult for implementation intentions to produce gains in absolute accuracy.
Number of Interruptions
Recall that we had previously hypothesized that implementation intentions might
cause a reduction in unrealistic optimism because they can shield ongoing goal
pursuits against interruptions. To examine this possibility, we analyzed the number of
interruptions during the writing of the assignment. Using participants’ self-reports,
we used the number of entries participants had listed to count the number of times
they were interrupted while working on the assignment. Number of interruptions was
then submitted to a oneway between-subjects ANOVA (condition: implementation
intention or goal intention). As expected, participants in the implementation–
intention conditions reported fewer interruptions than participants in the goal-
intention condition, F(1,78)  4.09, p5 0.05 (M  0.29 versus M  0.62).
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Mediation Analysis
To qualify as a potential mediator, the number of interruptions must not only bear a
significant relationship to unrealistic optimism. It must also eliminate or greatly
diminish the eect of making implementation intentions on unrealistic optimism,
when both number of interruptions and condition are entered into the analysis
(Baron & Kenny, 1986). To test for mediation, we conducted a series of separate path
analyses (see Figure 1). First, the direct relationship between implementation
planning and unrealistic optimism was significant, b  ÿ 0.24, t(1,78)  ÿ 2.13,
p5 0.04. Second, implementation planning was predictive of the number of
interruptions, b  ÿ 0.22, t(1,78)  ÿ 2.02, p5 0.05. Third, when implementation
planning and number of interruptions were entered into the equation simultaneously,
the number of interruptions was predictive of unrealistic optimism, b  0.41,
t(1,78)  3.98, p5 0.001. Moreover, the direct relationship between implementation
planning and unrealistic optimism became smaller and no longer significant,
b  ÿ 0.15, t(1,78)  ÿ 1.41, p  0.163.
Although the number of interruptions was found to mediate the eect of
implementation intentions on the overall rate of goal completion, this mediation
eect should logically be restricted to completion times. This is because interruptions
while working on the assignment occurred by definition only after participants had
initiated the experimental task. Consistent with this, the number of interruptions was
significantly correlated with optimistic bias in completion predictions, r
(80)  ÿ 0.54, p5 0.001, but not with optimistic bias in initiation predictions, r
(80)  ÿ 0.12, p  0.31. Thus, in line with expectations, the obtained decrease in the
number of interruptions only mediated a reduction in optimistic bias in completion
predictions, not in initiation predictions.
Figure 1. Path analyses depicting the mediating role of number of interruptions on unrealistic
optimism as a function of implementation planning. Notes: N  80. Coecients are
standardized betas. p5 0.05, p5 0.001
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DISCUSSION
People display a ubiquitous tendency to underestimate their task-completion times
(Buehler et al., 1994, 1995). Previously, researchers have sought to reduce this so-
called planning fallacy by leading people to temper their lofty expectations (e.g.
Buehler et al., 1994, 1997). Implicit in this approach is the notion that it is generally
easier to moderate one’s optimism than it is to dramatically improve the eciency of
one’s goal pursuits. As the current findings show, the eects of forming
implementation intentions defy this logic. On the one hand, the formation of
implementation intentions led to increased optimism in completion predictions. This
confirms earlier findings that reflecting on the implementation of one’s actions makes
people more optimistic (Armor & Taylor, 1997; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995). On the
other hand, however, this increase in optimism was exceeded by an increase in actual
rates of goal completion due to forming implementation intentions. The net result of
forming implementation intentions was therefore a reduction in unfounded optimism.
Thus, the present research provides the first unequivocal demonstration that the
formation of implementation plans can be an eective aide in attacking optimistic
bias in task-completion predictions.
Given that implementation intentions were found to have a powerful influence
on thought and action, it is important to identify the processes through which
implementation intentions may become eective. At first glance, the formation of
implementation intentions may seem very similar to Buehler et al.’s (1994, 1995)
description of scenario thinking. Indeed, while forming implementation inten-
tions, people are focusing on the future and imagine where and when they
intend to work on a given project (e.g. Gollwitzer & Brandsta¨tter, 1997).
However, the formation of implementation intentions also includes aspects that
are probably absent in spontaneously occurring scenario thinking. In particular,
the formation of implementation intentions explicitly requires that people
visualize the situation in which a particular behavior will be enacted. Thus,
vivid imagination of an intended action may constitute an important ingredient
of implementation planning (see also Taylor & Pham, 1996). Moreover, the
formation of implementation intentions explicitly recruits people’s will power, by
asking them to commit themselves to the intended behavior. Prior research has
shown that such willful commitment greatly enhances the eectiveness of
implementation intentions (Seehausen, Bayer, & Gollwitzer, 1994; Steller, 1992;
both discussed in Gollwitzer, 1996).
The present findings also oer further insight into the behavioral mechanisms that
may mediate the eectiveness of implementation planning. Following Gollwitzer and
Brandsta¨tter (1997), we suspected that implementation intentions might be
particularly helpful to get started. Contrary to this, however, implementation
intentions were found to be equally eective in both the stage of action initiation and
the stage of action completion. It thus appears that our findings cannot be fully
explained by the initiation-facilitating eects of implementation intentions. How else
could implementation intentions have improved the eciency of action completion?
One informative result is that implementation intentions led to a smaller number of
interruptions during action execution. Further analyses showed that the number of
interruptions statistically mediated the eects of implementation intentions on
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optimistic bias, suggesting that variations in the number of interruptions were able to
explain why implementation intentions led to a reduction in optimistic bias.
These interruption findings illuminate several important aspects of optimistic bias
in completion predictions. We obtained a strong relation between the number of
interruptions and optimistic bias, suggesting that optimistic bias arises when people
fail to take interruptions of their goal pursuits into account. This is consistent with
Buehler et al.’s (1995) theorizing that scenario thinking often leads people to neglect
potential impediments during task completion. It further appears that implementa-
tion planning promotes more eective shielding against such unexpected interrup-
tions, thus removing this source of bias from people’s predictions. Possibly, the
shielding function of implementation intentions is established during the stage of
action preparation, when people mentally seek out environments where task
completion will not be disturbed.3 Alternatively, the shielding function may be
reflective of a cognitive inhibition of distracting stimuli (Gollwitzer, 1991; Schaal &
Gollwitzer, 1999, both discussed in Gollwitzer, 1999). Further research is needed to
determine which of these possible mechanisms is responsible for reducing the number
of interruptions during goal pursuit.
In a way, the present findings indicate that implementation planning may allow
people to have their cake and eat it too: they can retain their optimistic outlooks
without running the risk of making excessive commitments. Nevertheless, we do not
mean to suggest that there are no limits to the benefits of implementation planning.
First and foremost, implementation planning only helps when people have chosen
reasonable goals (Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998). Thus, even the most eective
implementation planning will be of little help to individuals suering from delusions
of grandeur. The latter group of individuals is probably better o by adjusting their
aspirations to more realistic levels. As such, the eectiveness of implementation
planning may be dependent on the development of sucient meta-cognitive abilities
to recognize one’s own (in)competence (cf. Kruger & Dunning, 1999). Second,
forming implementation intentions is only likely to be eective when people have
sucient commitment to their goals (Orbell et al., 1997; cf. Gollwitzer, 1999). Third,
forming implementation intentions to execute a specific behavior may reduce a
person’s flexibility to engage suitable alternatives (Gollwitzer, 1999). This may be
harmful under rapidly changing conditions, when there is insucient time to shift
one’s commitments. Finally, people’s energy resources to engage in willful planning
may be limited (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Muraven, Tice, &
Baumeister, 1998). A more precise specification of the parameters that limit the
eectiveness of implementation planning provides an important agenda for future
research.
Before closing, it is important to note some potential limitations of the present
research. First, the present research relied on self-reporting to assess actual behavior.
3As noted by an anonymous reviewer, the present research allows no means of ascertaining that
implementation intention participants actually lived up to their prespecified plans, or whether they were
more eective in seeking out distraction-free environments during the action stage. Nevertheless, both
theoretical and empirical work by Gollwitzer and associates suggests that implementation intentions are
eective by strengthening the cognitive link between intended actions and a prespecified opportunity (e.g.
Gollwitzer & Brandsta¨tter, 1997; see also Aarts et al., 1999; Orbell et al., 1997). Thus, it seems theoretically
most plausible that any advantage due to a selection of distraction-free environments was already specified
during the preactional, planning stage. Further untangling these possibilities may be an interesting avenue
for future research.
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Thus, a critic might argue that the obtained eects of implementation intentions
could be due to social desirability. For several reasons, we believe that this is unlikely.
First, we took several precautions to minimize social desirability pressures, making it
clear to participants that their responses would remain anonymous. Moreover, the
main purpose of the investigation, i.e. examination of optimistic bias, was not
revealed to our participants through the use of a cover story. Both of these
precautions can be expected to reduce the likelihood that concerns with self-
presentation motivated our participants to confirm the experimenter’s hypotheses.
Finally, the present findings closely parallel other findings in the literature, most
notably those obtained by Gollwitzer and Brandsta¨tter (1997). In a highly similar
paradigm, Gollwitzer and Brandsta¨tter (1997) found no dierences between
completion dates reported by their participants and objective-completion dates.
Likewise, other research using objective behavioral measures has found that self-
reports of behavior are equally trustworthy for participants who have formed
implementation intentions and those who have not (e.g. Sheeran & Orbell, 1999).
Overall, it appears that the obtained eects of implementation intentions cannot be
explained by tendencies to engage in socially desirable reporting.
A second potential limitation is that the present research only examined one
indicator of successful goal pursuit, i.e. rates of completing a written assignment. In a
recent review, Armor and Taylor (1998) persuasively argued that optimistic
expectancies are often highly situated: optimistic expectancies tend to be expressed
more or less depending on the demands of the situation and the immediate needs of
the individual. Thus, the factors that influence optimistic bias in completion
predictions are not necessarily the same as the factors that influence optimistic bias in
predictions for other task outcomes. Given that other research has found
implementation intentions to be eective across a wide variety of behavioral domains
(cf. Gollwitzer, 1999), there are grounds for believing that the current findings are
generalizable to other settings. Nevertheless, it would be desirable to replicate the
current findings using alternative measures of successful goal completion.
CODA
Throughout history, scholars have been skeptical about the causal status of the will.
Even long before the days of Ach (1910), Hume (1739/1888; see Wegner & Wheatly,
1999) argued that the will is ‘nothing but the internal impression we feel and are
conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new
perception of our mind’ (p. 399). Although the role of the will in action control
continues to be controversial in the present day and age (Baumeister et al., 1998;
Wegner & Wheatley, 1999), recent years have witnessed an accumulation of cognitive
(Gollwitzer et al., 1990; Goschke & Kuhl, 1993), motivational (Brunstein &
Gollwitzer, 1996), and neurological (Kuhl, 1994; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999) findings
linking willful experience to action. The present work adds to this growing body of
research that certain forms of willing, i.e. implementation planning, may be especially
helpful in overcoming excessive optimism. Willful processes may thus serve a crucial
function in connecting thought to action. As such, it seems worth while to keep the
will alive in psychological theorizing.
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